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The study examines the effects of corporate board attributes on firm financial performance of publicly traded 
manufacturing companies in Bangladesh in the light of ‘comply or explain’ based on Corporate Governance 
Notifications (CGN) 2006 and ‘mandatory’ CGN 2012 of Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission 
(BSEC). BSEC makes the CGN mandatory in 2012 to ensure good governance at firm level. The regression results 
show that the revised CG guidelines are not capable of influencing firm performance measured by ROA but when 
performance is measured using Tobin’s Q, the revised guidelines are somewhat effective. We did not find any prior 
study in corporate governance literature that focuses on the effects of revised CGN 2012 on firm performance. 
This study is a pioneering research and it has led to an academic debate on the effectiveness of mandatory CG 
guidelines on corporate attributes and hence firm performance. 
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1.  Introduction 
The Cadbury Report in the UK (Cadbury, 1992, p. 15) defines corporate governance (CG) as “the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled”, which includes board composition and practices and their relationship 
with firm performance. CG is the system of supervision and management that affects the purpose and 
accomplishment of the corporate objectives. It is a way to assess and control the risk of a firm to ensure  its effective 
implementation. Good corporate governance structure encourages firms to create value through operations, 
research and innovation (Detthamrong et el., 2017). CG includes the concepts, theories and practices of boards 
and the relationship between boards and shareholders, top management, regulators and auditors and other level of 
stakeholders (Huq & Bhuiyan, 2012).It is evident that good CG has a positive effect on firm’s performance and 
market value (Chen et al., 2005; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Nguyen, 2011; Sami, Wang, & Zhou, 2008). Thus the 
recent national and global corporate scams raise the necessity for evaluating performance of the board in managing 
firm’s activities. 
The monitoring abilities of a corporate board depends on its effectiveness, which in turn is determined by 
some factors such as board composition, board size, CEO duality, gender diversity, ownership concentration, and 
board culture(Brennan, 2006). Following a large number of corporate scandals around the world, considerable 
research on corporate governance has been done in the context of developed countries including the USA, the UK, 
Australia, Germany and Japan but a less attention has been given to the emerging economies like Bangladesh 
(Rashid, 2009; Shleifer and Visny, 1997; Gibson, 2003; Denis and McConnel, 2005). However, the country has 
experienced a good number of corporate collapses over the years , such as Hallmark, Bismillah group, Oriental 
Bank, Modern Food Ltd, Adamjee Jute Mills Ltd ( the largest jute mills in the world) along with two major stock 
market crashes, first one in 1996 and the second one in 2010-11(Ferdous, 2018). The researchers find mixed results 
as to whether board structure especially dominance of outside directors, CEO duality or even board size have an 
impact on firm performance (Rashid at el, 2010a; Hasan at el, 2013).  
In early 2006, the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) a regulatory body issues and 
promulgates the Corporate Governance Notification (CGN) on comply or explain basis. It is also known as 
Corporate Governance Code of Best Practices which acts as a guideline for the firms in Bangladesh to adopt good 
governance practices. The CGN 2006 requires listed firms to appoint independent directors in the ratio of 1:10 in 
line with the Anglo-American-style and then it has been revised again in 2012 as a mandatory provision where the 
CGN requires listed firms to appoint independent directors in the ratio of 1:5. It is worth mentioning that the CG 
mechanism works well in the Anglo-American countries as the jurisdiction of those countries heavily depends on 
the transparency of enforcement of laws to protect shareholder’s rights (Asian Development Bank, 2000) which, 
in contrast, are found less effective in the case of emerging economies like Bangladesh as key institutional forces 
have little capacity to exert pressures on firms to ensure compliance (Rashid 2011). Thus the current study has 
been undertaken to examine the influence of corporate board attributes on firm performance in the context of 
Bangladesh, a rapidly growing economy.   We do not find any comprehensive study in the literature that examines 
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the influence of corporate board attributes on the firm performance of publicly traded manufacturing companies 
in Bangladesh. 
This study provides an additional insight into the influence of corporate board attributes on firm performance. 
It is hoped that the study will provide important quantitative information into CG and add to the existing body of 
empirical literature, especially in a developing country context. The outcome of the study will be useful to the 
policy makers of manufacturing companies as this sector has not been thoroughly investigated in this regard. The 
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the review of literature on corporate board 
attributes and firm’s performance such as board size, board independence, ownership concentration, CEO duality. 
Section 3 presents the methodological discussion. Section 4 presents the results and discussion. Section 5 presents 
conclusion and policy implications of the study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Board Size and Corporate Financial Performance 
The size of the corporate board plays an important role in the directors’ ability to oversee and control managers 
(Anderson et al., 2004). A large board is more likely to provide better access to various resources than a small one. 
A board of directors with diverse experience and knowledge would probably have more careful learning and 
decision-making processes, thus resulting in better firm performance. The empirical findings on the relationship 
between board size and firm performance are however mixed. For example, Yermack (1996) finds a negative 
relationship between board size and firm performance in a sample of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations over 
the period 1984 and 1991. Coles et al. (2008) found that firm performance increases with board size for complex 
firms. However, Jackling and Johl (2009) found that board size is a positively associated with firm performance 
in India. Eisenberg et al. (1998) reported a negative relationship between board size and firm performance in a 
sample of firms in Finland. Likewise, Mak and Kusnadi (2005) found a negative relationship between board size 
and firm value, measured as Tobin’s Q, for a sample of firms in Malaysia and Singapore. Overall, these findings 
suggest that as board size increases, firm performance tends to deteriorate. One plausible explanation is that large 
boards result in less communication between board members, poorer decisions, and ineffective coordination. In 
addition, firms with large boards are more likely to be controlled by the CEO. If the firms can overcome these 
challenges associated with the larger board, firm performance may improve. In summary, we expect the effect of 
board size on firm performance to be positive; therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H1. Board size is positively associated with firm performance. 
 
2.2 Board independence and firm performance 
An independent director (also known as an outside director) plays an important role in monitoring the firm’s 
management team. Therefore, the extent to which the board of directors is independent may attract investors 
(Muniandy and Hillier, 2015). Previous studies show that examine board independence and firm performance 
provide mixed results. On the one hand, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find that board independence has a negative 
effect on firm value, measured as Tobin’s Q, in the US. On the other hand, Jackling and Johl (2009) find that board 
independence has a positive impact on firm performance for firms in India. Likewise, Muniandy and Hillier (2015) 
reported that board independence has a positive influence on firm performance in South Africa. In the context of 
Malaysia, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find that board independence does not affect firm performance. Consistent 
with the literature, we argue that the presence of competent independent directors in the board would improve firm 
performance. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H2: Board independence is positively associated with firm performance. 
 
2.3 Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance 
Hossain and Rahman, (2013) mention that firms in Bangladesh are mostly concentrated ownership or controlled 
by dominant shareholders like corporate group or government. It is apparent that management of firms is just 
nothing but the extension of dominant owners as a result of which CEO, executive directors and chairman are from 
the controlling family in most of the  Bangladeshi firms. It is evident (Farooque et al. 2008) that on an average, 
the top five shareholders hold more than 50% of a firm’s outstanding share. Imam and Malik (2007) mention that 
the ownership patterns of 219 companies from 12 sectors listed on Dhaka Stock Exchange are found on average 
32.33% of the shares held by the top three shareholders. This percentage becomes larger in real estate, fuel and 
power, engineering, textile and pharmaceutical sectors.  Another study discloses that firms in Bangladesh are not 
willing to come to the stock market for their required funds as they fear to lose control over the firms (Haque et al. 
2006).   Hossain and Rahman, (2013) mention that the average shareholdings of top five and top ten shareholders 
are 50 percent and 60 percent respectively while the largest or top 1 shareholder owns around a quarter of the 
firm’s equity where manufacturing sector is relatively higher than the banks and insurance companies. 
Concentration of ownership to a small group will have a positive influence on firm’s value in Bangladesh as they 
have more dominance over management and also incentive to monitor the affairs of management, and hence reduce 
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agency conflicts (Hossain and Rahman, 2013). The bi-directional relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm value supports the indispensability of the role of the founder family or the Top-1 shareholder in 
Bangladesh. In this context, for the dominant presence of large shareholder, quasi external mechanisms (such as 
institutional investors, audit quality, debt ratio), are suppose to have their proper role in influencing firm value, 
phenomena that draw the attention of policy makers. In addition, firms in Bangladesh fail to ensure standard 
corporate governance practices in line with the developed countries. Thus we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. 
 
2.4 CEO-Chairman Duality and Firm’s Performance 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality refers to the leadership nature of board structure in which the CEO plays 
the dual role of chairman of the board also. The CEO-chairman duality enhances the possibility of violating the 
accounting principles and hence, the present CG practices in Bangladesh are highly criticized by corporate 
stakeholders and the unbiased segments of society, and are not acceptable to many developing countries (Hasan et 
al, 2014). There are two basic schools of scholars who debate on the issue of CEO duality and its impact on firm 
performance. On the basis of  the core concept of agency theory, one school of scholars supports that separation 
of the CEO-Chairman positions would maximize firm performance (Gillan, 2006; Harris & Helfat, 1998; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997), as the board has a neutral authority to supervise the CEO’s tasks. However, the empirical 
evidence for this relationship is inconclusive and mixed. 
Another school of scholars support for same position of CEO- Chairman as it reflects the stewardship theory 
of management. When the two positions CEO-Chairman are performed by one person, it ensures the monitoring 
and implementing control throughout the firm (Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005; Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson, 1997; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). Previous studies thus indicate both dual CEO and non-dual CEO 
firm can increase firm performance which is inconclusive to generate a single direction (Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 
1997; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Daily & Dalton, 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  We hypothesize that  
H4: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance. 
 
3.  Methodology 
3.1 Population and sampling 
This study is empirical in nature. Data have been collected from the published annual reports of the selected 
companies. The annual reports have been collected from the websites of the selected companies and DSE library. 
A total of  85 companies have been selected for the study while the total manufacturing companies is 150. Initially, 
the sample has been taken from firms listed on or before 2006 on the DSE. After eliminating the companies with 
missing data, the sample size has been 85 listed firms. We have taken this sample for data collection throughout 
the twelve years period. The sample size is representative because market capitalization of 85 selected companies 
is approximately 69.02% of the total market capitalization of the listed manufacturing companies in Bangladesh 
as on December 31, 2017. Chauhan et al. (2016) conducted a study in India for the period 2003-2013, where they 
include all manufacturing firms in India and initially find a total 970 firms but reports are available for 84 firms 
representing market capitalization of 55.49%. Rashid (2016) conducted a study in Bangladesh for the period of 
2001-2011 with the  sample of all non-financial companies listed on the DSE but based on the availability of 
annual reports, his sample includes only 110 companies,  resulting in a balanced sample of 1210 observations. 
The years 2006-2017 have been selected as the BSEC, the chief market regulator of Bangladesh capital market, 
issues Corporate Governance Notifications (CGN) in 2006 on comply or explain basis and then issued revised 
CGN in 2012 on mandatory basis. Thus the current study examines whether the revised CGN in 2012 aids for  the 
betterment of corporate board attributes in Bangladesh.  
 
3.2 Measurement of dependent and independent variables 
In the corporate governance literature, there are two types of measurement of firm performance: accounting 
measures (Elsayed 2007; Masulis et al. 2012) and market value measures (Elsayed, 2007; Black and Kim, 2012). 
However, the capital market in Bangladesh is underdeveloped and highly volatile in nature, and thus market based 
measures are not greatly responsive to firm’s economic performance. So, accounting based measures have been 
used in this study. Hence, the current study has used ROA (return on assets) as a measure of firm performance 
because it reflects the results of underlying firm’s economic performance. However, to check the robustness of the 
results, the study also uses Tobin’s Q as alternative performance measure of firm performance. The independent 
variables of the study are board size, board independence, ownership concentration, and CEO duality. Board size 
refers to the number of board members in the corporate board. Board independence refers to the ratio of 
independent directors to the total number of board members in the board. Ownership concentration refers to the 
proportion of shareholdings by the sponsor directors of the company as per the DSE shareholding pattern. CEO 
duality is a dummy variable which takes a value of zero if the same person holds the position of CEO and Chairman 
of the board and 1 otherwise.  
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3.3 Statistical model 
To examine the influence of corporate board attributes on firm performance, the following regression model has 
been developed: 
Yit = β0 + β1× BDSIZEit + β2× BDINDit + β3× OWNCONit+ β4× CEODUALit +βj Controlit + ɛit 
Where, 
Yit is alternatively ROAit, Tobin’s Qit 
BDSIZEit is the board size for ith firm at time t. 
BDINDit is the board independence for ith firm at time t. 
OWNCONit is the ownership concentration for ith firm at time t. 
CEODUALit is the CEO duality for ith firm at time t. 
Controlit  is the control variables used in the study 
β0 is the intercept, β1, β2, β3, andβ4 are the regression co-efficient 
ɛit is the error terms 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
The descriptive statistics indicates that the average firm performance of the companies measured as ROA is 8.91 
percent ranging from (-26) percent to 56 percent while the average firm performance measured as Tobin’s Q is 
106.73 percent ranging from 51 percent to 152 percent over a period of 2006-2017, which indicates that for every 
BDT 100 invested in asset there is a return of BDT 6.73. The average board size of the sample companies is 7.1556 
ranging from 2 to 14. The average board independence of the sample companies is 1.3943, which indicates that 
on average more than one outside directors sits on the corporate board as independent directors. The average equity 
share owned by the sponsor directors of manufacturing companies is 44.7615 percent ranging from .12 percent to 
92.91 percent. The descriptive statistics also shows that on average 24.36 percent firms has the CEO duality, which 
indicates that on average 75.64 percent of the firms have a separate person holding the position of the CEO and 
chairman of the company. 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 ROA Tobin’s Q BDSIZE BDIND OWNCON CEODUAL 
Mean .0891 1.0673 7.1556 1.3943 44.7615 .7564 
Median .0751 1.0552 7.0000 1.0000 47.6000 1.0000 
Std. Deviation .09347 .11570 1.86434 .66433 17.69749 .42945 
Minimum -.26 .51 2.00 1.00 .12 .00 
Maximum .56 1.52 14.00 5.00 92.91 1.00 
To check the multicollinearity problem, we conducted Person correlation analysis on the variables. The results 
show that ROA and Tobin’s Q are positively correlated. Besides, board size, board independence, and ownership 
concentration are also positively correlated with ROA and Tobin’s Q but CEO duality is negatively correlated with 
ROA which in turn positively correlated with Tobin’s Q. The correlation matrix also shows that no variable is 
correlated with more than 50 percent, and hence there is no multicollinearity problem. Thus the variables are 
eligible for regression analysis.  
Table 2. Correlations coefficient matrix 







1      
.231** 1     
.146** .078* 1    
.076* .033 .307** 1   
.269** .154** .174** .051 1  
-.009 .120** .048 .016 .067* 1 
Table 3 presents the regression results, which are quite revealing. It is evident that board size, board 
independence and ownership concentration are positively and CEO duality is negatively associated with ROA, but 
only the ownership concentration is statistically significant. Similarly, board size and ownership concentration are 
positively associated with Tobin’s Q and the association is significant. Ownership concentration is a common 
feature in South-Asian countries and our study support the need for concentration of corporate ownership in the 
hands of a few individuals and institutional investors to produce better incentives for equityholders to exercise 
rigorous monitoring process so as to enhance operational efficiency and minimize agency cost, and thus lead to 
superior performance. Concomitantly, the significant adverse effect of CEO duality on firm performance as 
measured by ROA and very insignificant positive effect as measured by Tobin’s Q suggest the need for firms to 
separate the post of CEO and chairman to ensure good governance and hence good performance. Contrarily, board 
independence is negatively associated with Tobin’s Q and the same is statistically insignificant. Independent 
Directors are appointed on the board to look after the interest of the let alone minority shareholders and ensure that 
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any deceitful or inept action of corporate management does not go unnoticed. In ideal world, an independent 
director should have independence of mind along with ability and ethical foundation to judge an issue without 
prejudice or bias towards the interest of any individual or group of individuals. But in the context of developing 
countries especially in Bangladesh, the reality is somewhat different.  In most of the cases, independent directors 
usually try to protect the interest of dominant/ majority shareholders instead of minority shareholders and all other 
stakeholders. The revealing feature is that the appointment of independent directors is normally controlled by 
controlling shareholders. Moreover, it is difficult to find any truly independent person for appointing as 
independent director in corporate boards. In such a situation, BSEC could prepare a panel of deserving candidates 
having sound ethical and professional background and make it mandatory to appoint independent directors from 
that panel following chronological order. Consequently,   board independence and firm performance will increase. 
There will be a win-win situation both for the minority and majority shareholders and good governance will prevail 
in the corporate sector in Bangladesh.  
On the other hand, control variables such as firm size and firm age are positively associated with ROA and 
the results are statistically significant. One possible explanation is that the older firm and the larger the size, the 
higher the firm performance (Dey et al., 2018) However, firm size is negatively and firm age is positively 
associated with Tobin’s Q and in both the cases the results are statistically significant. Another revealing feature 
is that all the sectors under manufacturing category are negatively associated with ROA` and the results are 
statistically significant. Similarly, all sectors are negatively associated with Tobin’s Q except cement sector and 
the results are statistically significant in case of Ceramics, Paper, Engineering, Jute and Textile sectors but in case 
of Cement, Pharmaceuticals and Tannery sectors, the regression results are not statistically significant. SECCODE 
is negatively associated with ROA and the association is statistically significant, but SECCODE is positively 
associated with Tobin’s Q and the result is not statistically significant.  
Table 3. Regression results 
Variables ROA Tobin’s Q Collinearity Statistics 
 Beta T Sig.  Beta T Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)  -3.681 .000  31.682 .000   
BDSIZE .017 .460 .646 .163 4.111 .000 .660 1.514 
BDIND .050 1.369 .172 -.036 -.921 .358 .679 1.473 
OWNCON .248 7.727 .000 .149 4.329 .000 .878 1.138 
CEODUAL -.013 -.331 .741 .091 2.239 .025 .632 1.582 
LNFSIZE .284 8.141 .000 -.445 -11.915 .000 .742 1.348 
FAGE .173 4.923 .000 .199 5.306 .000 .738 1.355 
SECCODE -.206 -5.715 .000 .049 1.261 .208 .697 1.435 
Cement -.285 -6.635 .000 .007 .161 .872 .490 2.042 
Ceramics -.252 -6.993 .000 -.110 -2.841 .005 .697 1.436 
Paper -.133 -4.134 .000 -.076 -2.212 .027 .874 1.144 
Engineering -.329 -6.748 .000 -.103 -1.979 .048 .381 2.626 
Jute -.235 -6.752 .000 -.131 -3.537 .000 .751 1.332 
Textile -.539 -9.946 .000 -.207 -3.577 .000 .308 3.243 
Pharmaceuticals -.292 -5.417 .000 -.020 -.345 .730 .312 3.206 
Tannery -.191 -4.824 .000 -.033 -.777 .437 .576 1.736 
Dependent variable: ROA Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q 
F statistics 26.785 17.570 
Significance .000b .000b 
R Square .364 .273 
*Food and Allied sector is a reference category, which takes a value zero. The manufacturing companies in 
Bangladesh are categorized into  
 Nine different sectors as per the Dhaka Stock Exchange, which are Cement, Ceramics, Paper, Engineering, 
Jute, Textile, Pharmaceuticals, Tannery and Food and Allied. 
*SECCODE is a dummy variable, where BSEC’s guidelines, 2006 takes value zero and BSEC’s guidelines, 
2012 takes value 1(one) 
Thus, on the whole, it can be concluded that the revised mandatory CG Guidelines fails to add any value to 
corporate board attributes and hence performance of publicly traded manufacturing companies in Bangladesh.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The current study has strived to examine the effects of corporate board attributes on firm financial performance of 
publicly traded manufacturing companies in Bangladesh taking the effects of BSEC’s guidelines on corporate 
governance to see whether the revised CGN in 2012 adds any value to the corporate board attributes which in turn 
influence firm performance. We know BSEC issues CGN in 2006 on comply or explain basis and then make it 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) DOI: 10.7176/RJFA 
Vol.10, No.16, 2019 
 
113 
mandatory in 2012 to ensure good governance at firm level management. The empirical results show that the 
revised CG guidelines of 2012 have failed to add any value to corporate board attributes and thus firm performance 
as measured by ROA. However, firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q is somewhat better in relation to 
board size and CO duality and to some extend negative in relation to CO duality. We know these two indicators 
express different meanings. ROA demonstrates operational performance, while Tobin's Q expresses future 
prospect i.e., growth opportunities of the corporate entity and as such it is not surprising to find somewhat different 
results using these two measures at the same time. 
We have not found any previous study in corporate governance literature that focuses on the effects of 
corporate board attributes on firm performance in light of the revised CG guidelines. Hence we have conducted 
this study and the empirical results lead us to an academic debate on the effectiveness of mandatory CG guidelines 
of 2012.  However, the study is conducted on publicly traded manufacturing companies using secondary data only 
and it is quantitative in nature. Future researchers will address this debate in a detailed way taking both financial 
and non financial companies and using mixed method of research. 
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